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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we investigate what people in Japan consider when deciding to take the influenza 
vaccination. We develop an economic model to explain the mechanism by which people decide to 
take the influenza vaccination. Using our model and the data obtained from a large-scale survey 
we conducted in Japan, we demonstrated that people make rational decisions about vaccinations 
after considering its cost and benefits. People consider the probability of infection, severity of the 
disease, and the vaccination’s effectiveness and side effects. The time discount rate is another 
consideration because the timing of costs and benefits of the vaccination differ. Risk aversion 
(fearing the contraction of the flu and vaccination’s side effects) also affects the decision. People 
also deviate from rationality—altruism and status quo bias play important roles in the 
decision-making. Overconfidence indirectly affects the decision via perception variables such as 
the subjective probability of infection and assessment of influenza’s severity. The decision also 
depends on attributes such as gender, age, and marital status. If the general perception of flu and 
vaccination is inaccurate, supplying accurate information regarding those may increase or 
decrease the vaccination rate, depending on whether this perception is, respectively, higher or 
lower than the objective rates. Thus, we examine whether the general perception is biased. Our 
survey suggests that disseminating information on the vaccination’s effectiveness may increase the 
rate of vaccination, whereas that on the probability of infection may have the opposite effect. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Influenza can be a serious disease in modern societies. As a serious pandemic, it can cause 
morbidity and mortality, as in 2009 with the swine flu. Since vaccination against flu can 
potentially prevent it, a study of the factors that are considered when making the decision to take 
or not to take the influenza vaccine can help prevent outbreaks of the disease. The objective of the 
current study is to examine how willingness to take the influenza vaccination depends on 
economic aspects such as costs and benefits as well as behavioral aspects including perceptions of 
influenza and the vaccination against it, preference parameters, and personal attributes. To achieve 
this aim, we use the behavioral economic model and results of a large data survey in Japan. 
 The study takes an economic approach and determines the relationship between vaccine 
taking and the costs/benefits of vaccination from utility-maximizing behavior. Based on the classic 
expected utility framework, we assume that people compare the benefits and costs of taking the 
vaccine, and choose to be vaccinated if the benefits exceed the costs. Our model predicts that the 
decision to be vaccinated depends on the perceived probability of infection, severity of the disease, 
side effects of vaccination, and inoculation costs.  
 The economic approach has been used to examine individual decisions regarding whether or 
not to take the vaccine [4, 9, 11]. Nevertheless, the theoretical framework of Shahrabani et al. [11] 
show that the decision to take the vaccine based on objective factors can differ from that based on 
subjective or psychological factors. Their results show that values of objective factors predict a 
very high vaccination rate, implying that an individual’s perceptions and beliefs do not accurately 
reflect actual values; further, it predicts that behavioral factors may be important in the decision. 
For example, perceived risks of infection may affect an individual’s propensity to be immunized [9]. 
Thus, psychological factors, in addition to economic variables, should be considered to fully 
understand the reasons for the vaccination rate.  
 The Health Belief Model (HBM) developed by Rosenstock et al. [10] is a traditional 
psychological approach to explaining and predicting preventive health behavior. HBM has been 
used to explore a variety of health behaviors, including vaccination [3, 6, 8, 12, 14]. According to 
the HBM, the acceptance of an influenza vaccine depends on the following predictors: perception 
of susceptibility to influenza, beliefs about the severity of influenza, perceived benefits of the 
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vaccine in preventing influenza, and perceived barriers to accepting a vaccine [3, 5].  
 The factors that explain vaccination behavior according to utility-maximizing behavior are 
very similar to those of the HBM. However, our theory predicts that an individual’s time discount 
and risk aversion also play important roles in the decision to take a vaccination or not. We 
hypothesize that people choose to take a flu vaccination when the benefits exceed the costs 
(specified as benchmark equations in section 2.1), but introduce an extended model that takes into 
account behavioral aspects which may affect the decision to be vaccinated. In particular, we 
examine whether psychological factors such as altruism, overconfidence, and the status quo effect 
play an important role in the decision.  
 We designed questions concerned with a respondent’s beliefs and preferences with regard to 
influenza and vaccination, and conducted a large-scale survey in Japan to test our theoretical 
hypothesis. Thus, although we rely on the economic approach, we actually use perception or belief 
variables, as does the HBM, so that our results are immune to the critique of [11].  
 The current study contributes to existing literature by (a) theoretically and empirically 
elucidating the important role of time discounting and risk aversion in the decision to take a 
vaccination, (b) expanding the behavioral economic model to include the impact of altruism on the 
willingness to be vaccinated; (c) presenting empirical results of the model using a large-scale 
survey in Japan; (d) applying the results to derive policy implications with regard to dissemination 
of information on influenza and the vaccination against it; and (e) comparing factors affecting the 
willingness among Japanese people to be vaccinated to factors affecting the population in the USA 
as reported in previous studies [14]. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we explain the analytical framework including 
the basic model and extended model. In subsections 2.1 and 2.2, we develop a model based on 
rationality, while in subsection 2.3, we introduce behavioral variables to the basic model. Section 
3 explains the methods and describes the survey in Japan. Section 4 is devoted to the results. 
Section 5 summarizes the study and concludes by showing how the inoculation rate can be 
increased. 
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2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. Model 
Benefits: The benefits of vaccination are (a) improving current and future health and (b) reducing 
the degree of inconvenience to one’s family and friends when one is infected with flu. These 
benefits are realized a couple of months after being vaccinated. Thus, the magnitude of the 
benefits depends on how one perceives (1) the seriousness of the disease, (2) how the vaccination 
relieves the condition, and (3) the probability of infection, as well as his/her time discount rate, 
and risk aversion. Time discounting matters because the benefits of vaccination are received in the 
future, while the costs are paid earlier. Risk aversion involves assessing the risk of contracting flu 
and the side effects of the vaccination. 
 We denote the probability of contracting flu by PROB, the effectiveness of the vaccination by 
EFFECT, and the damage of contracting flu by DAMAGE. Thus, the damage of contracting flu is 
reduced to DAMAGEEFFECT ×− )1( , where EFFECT is assumed to take on a value between 
zero and one.  
 Costs: The cost of vaccination (COST) consists of the fee for inoculation (FEE), opportunity, 
and psychological costs of taking the vaccination, and perceived side effects of vaccination 
(SIDEEFFECT). We assume that people suffer these costs at the time of vaccination.  
 Decision to be vaccinated: The utility of the individual in our model is defined over 
consumption in two periods, 1x  and 2x . In period 1, the individual decides whether he/she 
wants to take the vaccine, and in period 2, the individual may be infected by influenza. Thus, the 
expected utility in the case of taking vaccination is: 
 [ ]))1(()()1()( 221 DAMAGEEFFECTxuPROBxuPROBCOSTxu ×−−×+×−+− θ  (1) 
while the expected utility of not taking vaccination is: 
 [ ])()()1()( 221 DAMAGExuPROBxuPROBxu −×+×−+θ   (2) 
where θ  is the discount factor. A person will take the vaccination if the value of Equation (1) is 
larger than the value of Equation (2). 
 Assuming that COSTxx >>≈ 21 and DAMAGE, and expanding the utility function to the 
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second order, we find that people take the vaccination, if:  
 [ ] 0)2(
2
1 22 >×−×××−−
××+−
DAMAGEEFFECTEFFECTPROBCOST
DAMAGEEFFECTPROBCOST
θα
θ
 (3) 
where α  stands for the absolute risk aversion, 
'
"
u
u
− . This inequality implies that people are 
more likely to take the vaccination when (a) PROB, (b) EFFECT, or (c) DAMAGE is greater, (d) 
COST or (e) time discount rate ( 11 −
θ
) is smaller, or (f) risk aversion (α ) is higher (lower, 
respectively), in the case where the fear of getting the flu is greater (smaller) than the fear of side 
effects, i.e., 22 )2()( DAMAGEEFFECTEFFECTPROBCOST ×−×××>< θ (see Appendix 1). 
Conditions (a) to (d) conform to the results of the HBM. 
 Assuming a linear function, (a) to (f) are described in Equation (4), which is the basic 
equation for estimating willingness to take the vaccination (WTVACCIN). 
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uaa
COSTaDAMAGEaEFFECTaPROBaaWTVACCIN
+++
++++=
αθ 76
53210  (4) 
where the subscript i stands for the individual i. It is straightforward to prove that 0, 21 >aa  and 
0,, 653 <aaa , and 7a  will be positive when DAMAGE dominates SIDEEFFECT. 
 To identify the channels through which risk aversion affects WTVACCIN, we adopt cross 
terms of risk aversion and COST, and risk aversion and DAMAGE, using the following equation. 
 
iiii
iiiiii
uCOSTaDAMAGEa
aCOSTaDAMAGEaEFFECTaPROBaaWTVACCIN
+++
+++++=
αα
θ
98
653210  (5) 
where it is demonstrated that 0and0 98 <> aa . 
 
2.2. Variables in the basic equation 
Willingness to get the vaccination: WTVACCIN is the respondent’s intention to take the 
vaccination within 12 months. 
 Probability of infection: PROB is the respondent’s assessment of the probability of being 
infected with flu within 12 months, expressed as a percentage. 
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 Damage of flu: DAMAGE is the respondent’s assessment of the damage suffered if he/she 
contracts flu. It consists of two elements: SEVERITY, the respondent’s assessment of the potential 
severity of the disease; and BOTHER, the respondent’s assessment of the degree to which his/her 
family and friends would be inconvenienced if the respondent were infected. 
 Effectiveness of vaccination is denoted as EFFECT. 
 Cost of vaccination: We examine COST using the following: (a) the respondent’s assessment 
of the seriousness of the side effects of a flu shot, SIDEEFFECT, (b) the monetary cost of the shot, 
and (c) the psychological costs. Variables relating to the monetary cost include the inoculation fee, 
FEE, and per capita income, INCOME, used to normalize the FEE. Variables associated with the 
opportunity costs of taking the injection include wage and regional dummies, which include 
factors such as the cost of transportation to the administering hospital.  
 Preferences: Preferences include time discount rate, TDR, and absolute risk aversion, ARA. 
To determine TDR, we ask respondents which option they prefer: an earlier receipt with a smaller 
reward or a later receipt with a larger reward. To determine ARA, we ask respondents which 
option they prefer: lower wage with lower risk or higher wage with higher risk, following the 
method of Barsky et al. [2]. Definitions of all the variables we used are presented in Appendix 2. 
 Using these notations of the variables, our basic Equation (4) is now described as 
 
iii
iiii
uARAbTDRbINCOMEbSIDEEFFECTbFEEb
BOTHERbSEVERITYbEFFECTbPROBbbWTVACCIN
++++++
++++=
98765
43210  (6) 
 
2.3. Extension of the model considering behavioral variables 
Our basic model assumes that rational individuals decide whether they want to take the 
vaccination based only on the costs and benefits of vaccination. However, other variables 
representing behavioral preferences and attributes may also affect the decision. In this subsection, 
we present an extended model that incorporates behavioral preferences and socio-economic 
variables into the basic Equation (6). 
 Our extended model takes into consideration an individual’s altruism, overconfidence, anxiety 
regarding his/her health, and experiences of vaccination and flu, i.e., behavioral preferences that 
are often disregarded in traditional economics.  
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 Altruism: Those who are more altruistic and caring may be more likely to take a vaccine 
because they want to avoid troubling other people. If so, the degree of altruism, ALTRUISM, has a 
positive effect on taking a vaccination. To examine this, we insert 
BOTHERALTRUISMbb )( 224 +  or BOTHERbALTRUISMb 410 +  instead of BOTHERb4  
in the regression, where b4 and b22 represent concern for family and friends, and b10 for the public. 
We expect b4 and b22>0. In addition, b10>0 if a respondent believes that vaccination will mitigate 
flu epidemics and improve social welfare.  
 Overconfidence: Overconfidence may lower a respondent’s assessment of the potential level 
of PROB, SEVERITY, SIDEEFFECT, or BOTHER. However, these variables are already included 
in the regression. To examine whether or not overconfidence affects vaccination behavior through 
some other channel not already specified in the regression, we add a variable for overconfidence, 
OVERCON.  
 Anxiety over health condition: Those who are concerned about their health will tend to take 
the vaccination. Thus, we take into account three variables: the degree of their health anxiety, 
UNHEALTH, and whether they undergo blood tests periodically, TESTP, or when disease is 
suspected, TESTS. 
 Psychological costs: Status quo bias means that people are reluctant to try new things [7]. 
Accordingly, people who have never been vaccinated may resist taking the vaccination while 
those who are accustomed to being vaccinated every year may be reluctant to stop being 
vaccinated. We measure this psychological cost of taking the vaccination by the respondent’s 
experience with flu vaccination, EXVACCIN. Those vaccinated in recent years are more likely to 
be vaccinated again.  
 Past experience of catching flu: Past experience of being ill with the flu, EXFLU, is also 
expected to influence WTVACCIN. Those seriously affected in the past will tend to take the 
vaccination, while those who experienced a mild infection may think that inoculation is 
unnecessary. Those seriously affected would have clearer memories of their illness and EXFLU is 
expected to be positive.  
 Attributes: We include gender, age, marital status, whether or not the respondent has children, 
and level of education in our extended regression Equation (7):  
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uBOTHERALTRUISMbSCHOOLb
NOCHILDbUNMARRYbAGEbMALEbEXFLUbEXVACCINb
TESTSbTESTPbHEALTHbOVERCONbALTRUISMb
UMBRELLAARAbHOMEWORKTDRbINCOMEbSIDEEFFECTb
FEEbBOTHERbSEVERITYbEFFECTbPROBbbWTVACCIN
+×++
++++++
+++++
++++
+++++=
2221
201918171615
1413121110
9876
543210
)()(
 (7) 
  
3. DATA AND THE ESTIMATION METHOD 
3.1. Data 
Data used in this paper were obtained from a survey conducted by the COE (Center of Excellence) 
project of Osaka University in February 2005 with 4300 people from throughout Japan, randomly 
selected by the double stratified random sampling method.1
 
 The selected participants were visited 
in their homes and given a questionnaire. Several days later, the filled-out questionnaires were 
picked up from their homes; 2987 questionnaires (70%) were returned. The range, means, and 
standard deviations of the main variables used for the analysis are presented in Table 1. 
Place Table 1 here 
 
3.2. Estimation method 
Since willingness to get the vaccination, WTVACCIN, is an ordered variable from 1 to 5, we 
estimate Equation (6) by ordered probit. A problem with this estimation is that those who decide to 
take the vaccination usually assess PROB to be lower than those who choose not to be vaccinated 
do. Thus, a reverse causality between WTVACCIN and PROB exists, making PROB an 
endogenous variable. 
This conjecture has some support. WTVACCIN among 60--70-year-old respondents is 
significantly higher than among 20--50-year-olds. 2
                                                   
1 The questionnaire (in Japanese) is found at 
http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/coe/project/survey-0502.pdf. 
 In contrast, PROB decreases with age, 
probably because elderly people are more likely to take the flu vaccination than younger people 
and believe that they are protected against the flu. 
2 The t statistic of the difference of means test between over- and under-60 groups is 10.2, rejecting the 
hypothesis of equal means at very low probability. Thus, those over 60 are more willing to be 
vaccinated than those under 60. Experience of vaccination, EXVACCIN, is also higher for over- 60s.  
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 Since all the subjective variables, including WTVACCIN, may be endogenous, we check to see 
if results that do not correct the endogeneity biases are robust. We eliminate this endogeneity by 
regressing each subjective variable over the exogenous variables to estimate a reduced form. In 
the case of PROB, we construct the fitted value, FITTTED_PROB, as in regression Equation (8). 
Using FITTED_PROB instead of PROB in Equation (7) will correct the endogeneity biases.3
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uSCHOOLcNOCHILDc
UNMARRYcAGEcMALEcEXFLUcEXVACCINc
TESTScTESTPcHEALTHcOVERCONcALTRUISMc
UMBRELLAARAcHOMEWORKTDRcINCOMEccPROB
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+++++
+++=
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 (8) 
By the same token, SEVERITY and BOTHER may be affected by WTVACCIN. Thus, we estimate 
Equation (8) for these two variables and construct the fitted values, FITTED_SEVERITY and 
FITTED_BOTHER.  
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Results of basic Equation (6) 
Estimates of basic Equation (6) are presented in the left-hand columns of Table 2. Because the 
dependent variable, WTVACCIN, is denoted in integers from 1 to 5, and larger values indicate 
stronger willingness, we estimate the equation with ordered probit. However, we do not try to 
correct endogeneity biases here. Pseudo 2R  is around 0.11, high for a cross-sectional regression 
with a large number of samples. Most of the estimates are significant and show the expected sign, 
suggesting that basic Equation (6), assuming rational choice, explains vaccination behavior well. 
 
Place Table 2 here 
 
 PROB, EFFECT, SEVERITY, BOTHER, and SIDEEFFECT are highly significant, showing a 
positive sign as expected. FEE is not significant, implying that monetary cost is not important in 
Japan. However, per capita household income has a positive sign and is significant at the 5% level, 
suggesting that higher income promotes WTVACCIN. This may be because the fee is of less 
                                                   
3 Equation (8) is identified by the absence of the insignificant variables present in Equation (7). 
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importance to households with a higher income. 
 To save space, we do not show the results associated with opportunity costs in this regression 
in Table 2. Therefore, the following is a brief report on the effect of opportunity costs. Important 
opportunity costs include those for transportation and lost revenue. Direct data are not available 
for transportation costs, so we make do with dummy variables dependant on the size of the 
respondent’s city and region. Lost revenue is defined as the time required to take the vaccination 
multiplied by the wage rate. In the questionnaire, we ask respondents how many hours they work 
per week, how many days per year, and how much income they receive for their labor. Thus, 
WAGE is calculated as labor income/(work hours × work days/7). We add WAGE and regional and 
city-size dummies (proxies for lost time) to Equation (6). Although WAGE was expected to 
negatively affect WTVACCIN, the estimate is not significant. Likewise, none of the regional and 
city-size dummies were significant at the 5% level. However, while we found no evidence that 
opportunity costs significantly affect vaccination behavior, this may not necessarily imply that 
opportunity costs are unimportant since our data regarding opportunity costs are far from perfect. 
 TDR, the time discount rate for the immediate future, has a significant negative sign, as 
predicted in our model, implying that those who heavily discount the expected benefits of 
vaccination are less likely to take the vaccination. Discount rates over a long time horizon, such as 
one year, however, are not significant, implying that time discounting for the immediate future is 
crucial for WTVACCIN (results not shown to save space).  
 ARA has a significant positive sign, suggesting that fear of contracting flu dominates any fear 
of side effects from the vaccination. Thus, risk aversion promotes taking the vaccination.  
 
4.2. Results of extended Equation (7) 
Results of the extended model Equation (7), including ALTRUISM in the regression, are presented 
in the middle columns of Table 2. The fit of this specification is good. The adjusted 2R  is much 
improved, compared to the basic Equation (6).4
 The coefficient of ALTRUISM, b10, is significant at the 0.1% level, suggesting that those who 
 The estimates of the variables included in basic 
Equation (6) are almost the same.  
                                                   
4 This is partly due to the inclusion of experience of vaccination, EXVACCIN. 
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are altruistic tend to take vaccinations in order to avoid flu epidemics in the society. 
UNHEALTH has a significant positive sign, as expected. However, TESTP and TESTS are 
insignificant, even though they have positive signs. OVERCON is insignificant, suggesting that it 
does not affect vaccination behavior through channels other than those specified in the regression, 
such as PROB.  
 EXVACCIN is highly significant, indicating that having been vaccinated in the past reduces 
the psychological costs of taking a vaccination. The large coefficient suggests that psychological 
costs carry great weight in the decision to be vaccinated, supporting the “status quo bias” 
hypothesis that human beings are reluctant to change. EXFLU is positive but insignificant, 
suggesting that painful memories of previous experiences with flu dominate relatively pleasant 
memories, but only slightly.  
 Among attributes, females, the elderly, the unmarried, and those who have children are more 
likely to take a vaccination. Schooling does not affect vaccination behavior.  
 When ALTRUISM*BOTHER replaces ALTRUISM in the equation (right-hand columns of 
Table 2), the cross term is highly significant with a positive sign, implying that those who are 
altruistic tend to take the vaccination to avoid troubling their families and not only in 
consideration of avoiding flu epidemics in the society.5
 
 
4.3. Examination of time discount rate (TDR) and risk aversion (ARA) 
While the total number of responses to the survey was 2987, only 1849 observations were 
available for estimating Equation (6), partly because many respondents did not answer questions 
on TDR and ARA.6
                                                   
5 However, neither is significant when both terms are included at the same time. 
 Thus, to check the robustness of the results, we present the results using 
qualitative data associated with TDR and ARA in the left-hand columns of Table 3. There, 
HOMEWORK is data relating to when the respondent did his/her homework as a child (those who 
made it a rule to do homework, which symbolized an unpleasant obligation, early in the school 
holiday are regarded as more patient or more future-oriented). UMBRELLA is determined by 
asking how high the probability of rain has to be to motivate the respondent to carry an umbrella 
6 The number of observations was also limited by the fact that many respondents did not answer the 
question regarding income. 
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(those who report that a low probability is sufficient are regarded as more risk-averse). In this case, 
2173 observations are available. UMBRELLA is positive and significant at the 0.1% level, and 
HOMEWORK is negative and significant at the 5% level, confirming the results for TDR and ARA. 
Estimates of other variables are almost unchanged from those presented in the left-hand columns 
of Table 2, indicating that our results are robust for the sample size.7
 
 
Place Table 3 here 
 
 In the middle and right-hand columns of Table 3, we show the estimation results of Equation 
(5), which examines two channels through which risk aversion impacts WTVACCIN. When cross 
terms for risk aversion and severity (representing DAMAGE), ARA*SEVERITY, and risk aversion 
and side effects (representing COST), ARA*SIDEEFFECT, are used, the coefficient of the former, 
i.e. a8 in equation (5), is positive and significant at the 1% level, and that of the latter, i.e. a9 in 
equation (5), is negative and significant at the 5% level (middle columns). This result supports our 
hypothesis that risk aversion operates through the fear of getting the flu, which is stronger than the 
fear of side effects of the vaccination. When a cross term for risk aversion, severity, and effect, 
ARA*SEVERITY*EFFECT, is used instead of ARA*SEVERITY, the results are unchanged 
(right-hand columns).8
 
 This result is consistent with the result that risk aversion, in general, 
negatively affects WTVACCIN. 
4.4. Perception variables 
Estimation of the auxiliary Equation (8) reveals that OVERCON negatively affects PROB at the 
10% significance level, SEVERITY at the 0.1% level, and BOTHER at the 10% level (the results 
are not shown to save space). The dummy variable for being male, MALE, has the same signs as 
those of OVERCON in all the estimations.9
                                                   
7 However, estimates of the coefficients of variables associated with the cost of vaccination changed 
from those in Table 2. This is because the psychological cost, EXVACCIN, is not included in basic 
Equation (6). When EXVACCIN is included, the coefficients of SIDEEFFECT, INCOME, and FEE are 
almost unchanged.  
 As expected, UNHEALTH positively affects PROB, 
8 See footnote 7. 
9 Barber and Odean [1] argue that males are more overconfident than females and use a male dummy 
as a proxy of overconfidence. 
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SEVERITY, and BOTHER. A dummy variable for having no children, NOCHILD, understandably 
has a negative coefficient in the BOTHER equation. AGE is highly significant with a negative sign 
in PROB and BOTHER equations. SCHOOL is significantly negative for SEVERITY and positive 
for BOTHER, but insignificant for PROB. 
 
4.5. Results of Equation (7) using fitted values 
To correct for possible endogeneity biases, we estimate Equation (7) using fitted values of PROB, 
SEVERITY, and BOTHER (Table 4).10
 
 The fitted values are used one by one because they are 
highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is around 0.5), which seems to cause multicolinear 
problems when all three are used at the same time. 
Place Table 4 here 
  
 When PROB is substituted by FITTED_PROB, most of the estimates are unchanged from 
those in Table 2, suggesting that the subjective assessment of the probability of infection causes 
the decision for taking the vaccination. FITTED_SEVERITY is significantly positive and most 
estimates are similar to those in Table 2, suggesting that SEVERITY also causes WTVACCIN. 
FITTED_BOTHER, however, is insignificant, casting a doubt on whether BOTHER really affects 
WTVACCIN. The causality may be reverse, and it may be that those who plan to take the 
vaccination believe that they will bother their family less by doing so. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper develops an economic model to explain the mechanism by which people in Japan 
decide whether or not to take the influenza vaccination. Using our model and data obtained from a 
large-scale survey we conducted in Japan, we demonstrate that people rationally make the 
decision considering the costs and benefits of vaccination. People take into account the probability 
of infection, severity of the disease, and effectiveness and side effects of the vaccination. Time 
                                                   
10 OVERCON and EXFLU, which are insignificant in the middle column of Table 2, are excluded from 
this regression. 
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discount rate matters because the timing of costs and benefits of vaccination differs. Risk aversion 
also affects the decision through the fear of contracting the flu and the fear of side effects of the 
vaccination. However, we found no evidence that monetary cost is important in making the 
decision.11
 Yet, people also deviate from rationality. Altruism, a behavioral variable, plays an important 
role in making the decision. To the best of our knowledge, the effect of altruism on the willingness 
to be vaccinated has not yet been examined. The status quo bias is clearly recognized, in that 
people who have never been vaccinated tend to avoid taking the vaccination. Overconfidence 
affects the decision indirectly via perception variables such as the subjective probability of 
infection and assessment of the severity of influenza, similar to findings in the USA sample [14]. 
The decision also depends on attributes such as gender, age, and marital status.  
 The results of this Japanese sample are compatible with the findings of Tsutsui et al. 
[14] with respect to their USA sample.  
 The results of this paper have interesting implications. First, raising the inoculation rate is 
often thought to be socially desirable because taking a vaccination has strong externality. However, 
we found that the degree of altruism affects the willingness to take vaccination not only through 
the channel of concern for one’s family and friends (the coefficient of ALTRUISM, b22, in Table 2), 
but also through a channel of caring about a wider range of people (the coefficient of 
ALTRUISM*BOTHER, b10, in Table 2). Therefore, if most Japanese people are altruistic, the 
vaccination rate will not differ substantially from the social optimum. However, our survey 
indicates that 44% of Japanese respondents show no altruism, suggesting that it is desirable for the 
society to raise the vaccination rate to a level higher than the rate that people choose 
spontaneously.12
 Second, if the general perception of flu and vaccination is inaccurate, supplying accurate 
information on the illness, its possible complications, and the effectiveness of the vaccination will 
probably raise or lower the vaccination rate, depending on whether this perception is higher or 
lower than the objective rates. Thus, we examine whether the general perception is biased, 
although our caveat is that the following assessment is crude. WTVACCIN depends on six 
  
                                                   
11 However, since previous studies, such as Steiner et al. [13], found that monetary cost has an impact 
on the decision to take a vaccination, our results should be examined further from various aspects. 
12 In the USA, only 24% are not altruistic based on our survey results. 
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perceptions: PROB, SEVERITY, BOTHER, EFFECT, SIDEEFFECT, and FEE. The mean PROB 
is 24%, which is very high considering the fact that according to the website of “global security” 
(http:// ww.globalsecurity.org/security/ops /hsc-scen-3_flu-pandemic-deaths.htm), the influenza 
infection rate is 5%–15% (except during pandemic periods). Although there are no statistics on the 
total number of flu cases in Japan, based on the 1.56 million infections reported in 2005 from 
4700 hospitals, the probability of infection is only 1.5% (A website of National Infectious Disease 
Surveillance Center: http:// dsc.nih.go.jp/idwr/ydata/report-Jb.html). This number, of course, 
underestimates the true rate because it is based on reports from the limited number of hospitals. 
More reliable information can be derived from our survey. Some 10.5% of our respondents 
indicated that they were infected with flu during the previous two years, reflecting a yearly 
probability of infection of about 5%.13 Since this rate is still substantially lower than the 
subjective probability of being infected (24%), providing information on the probability of 
contracting flu would probably reduce the average vaccination rate.14
However, the infection rates differ between different age groups and between those who 
took the vaccine and those who did not take it. Therefore, we examined the subjective infection 
rates and the infection rates in the following sub-samples: male vs. female, over-60s vs. under-60s, 
those who took the flu shot during the past two years vs. those who did not take it. 
 
Our results (not shown in the paper) indicate that the subjective probability differs between 
the sub-groups: female-25.5% vs. male-22.5%; people under 60 years-25.6% vs. people over 60 
years-20.0%; those who took the vaccine during the last two years-26.4% vs. those who did not 
take the vaccine during this period-23.3%. Nonetheless, in all sub-groups we found that the 
subjective probability was substantially higher than the experienced flu rate during the last two 
years. 
 Most of the other perception variables are qualitative and not easy to compare with actual 
figures. For FEE, 55% chose “the fee is 2000-5000 yen,” and for SEVERITY, 60% chose “a 
                                                   
13 Yet, it could be that this number reflects also “flu-like” symptoms which are sometimes wrongly 
attributed to the influenza illness. 
14 One may argue that the flu rate varies substantially from year to year, so that we should not compare 
the subjective probability of 2005 with experienced probability for the past two years. According to the 
statistics reported by the National Infectious Disease Surveillance Center, the number of influenza 
infections reported by the hospitals designated to report the infection in 2005 was almost double the 
number reported in 2004, and 1.3 times the number reported in 2003. Thus, the actual rate of infection 
is probably larger than 5%. Yet, there is no reason to believe that this rate exceeds 10%. 
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disease from which it takes about a week to recover,” both of which do not seem to radically 
contradict the facts. However, with regard to the effectiveness of the vaccination, while 60% of the 
respondents correctly answered “the shot can prevent certain types of flu,” 20% selected “despite 
the flu shot, a high possibility of getting the flu remains,” which contradicts the truth and 
underestimates the effectiveness of vaccination. With reference to the side effects of vaccination, 
although 50% accurately answered that “side effects have little influence,” about 10% selected 
“very serious side effects that could cause after-effects” and 5% selected “extremely serious side 
effects that could cause death,” which overestimate potential side effects of flu vaccination.  
 In sum, although the comparisons are crude, they seem to suggest that Japanese people 
evaluate the effectiveness of vaccination as too low and the side effects as too high in number and 
level of severity. In this case, dissemination of information on the effectiveness of vaccination 
may help raise the vaccination rate. On the other hand, they seem to perceive too high a 
probability of getting the flu. If this is true, provision of correct information on the probability of 
infection may mitigate their willingness to be vaccinated. These conclusions are the same as those 
of [14] with respect to the USA, which are derived by an econometric analysis.  
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Appendix 1 Derivation of Equation (3) and the expected sign of the coefficients 
For simplicity, let us assume that 1x  and 2x  are independent of the decision on 
vaccination and they are much larger than the costs and benefits due to vaccination. Then, 
expanding the utility (1) and (2) around 1x  and 2x  respectively, we obtain, 
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Denoting the left side of (A1) as Ω , a larger Ω  implies more willingness to take the 
vaccination. Therefore, the derivative of Ω  to these elements implies the effect of each element 
of the equation on the willingness to be vaccinated against flu. Differentiating Ω  from each term, 
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Appendix 2 Definition of the data 
In this appendix, we explain the variables used in the analysis. 
WTVACCIN: Willingness to take the vaccination, which is defined as 6 minus the answer to the 
question “Do you intend to receive the flu shot in the next 12 months?” The answer is given on a 
five-point scale from “1 Yes, certainly” to “5 No, certainly not.” A larger WTVACCIN implies 
greater willingness to take vaccination.  
PROB: Subject probability of infection (PROB) is defined as the answer (%) to the question 
“Estimate your chances of being infected with the flu during the next 12 months.”  
EFFECT: With reference to the effectiveness of a flu shot, we asked, “How effective do you think 
the flu shot is?” and define a variable EFFECT as 6 minus the answer to this question, which is 
any one of five options on a scale from “1 The shot can completely prevent the flu” to “5 The shot 
is never effective.”  
SEVERITY: For seriousness of the disease, we define SEVERITY as 7 minus the answer to the 
question “How serious a disease do you think the flu is?” which is one of six options on a scale 
from “1 An extremely serious disease which could cause death” to “6 A disease which has little 
influence.” 
BOTHER: With regard to the degree of bother for one’s family and friends when one is infected, 
we defined BOTHER as the answer to the question “When you are infected with the flu, to what 
extent do you bother your family and friends?” which is one of four options on a scale from “1 I 
bother them tremendously” to “4 I hardly bother them.”  
SIDEEFECT: With regard to the seriousness of the side effects of a flu shot, we defined 
SIDEEFFECT as 8 minus the answer to the question “How serious do you think the side effects 
caused by a flu shot are?” This is one of the seven options on a scale from “1 Extremely serious 
side effects which could cause death” to “7 There are no side effects.” 
FEE: For the injection fee, we defined FEE as the answer to the question “How much do you 
think a flu shot costs?” which is any of six options on a scale from “1 free” to “6 more than 
$50.00.” 
TDR: Discount rates are estimated from the following questions: “Which would you choose, 
receiving $100 in 2 days or in 9 days?” Eight different pairs of options that correspond to different 
interest rates ranging from -10% to 300% are presented. Respondents are requested to choose 
earlier or later receipt in these eight cases. Most respondents rationally chose earlier options 
during low interest rates, switched to a later option at some interest rate, and kept choosing it for 
higher interest rates. We define a variable TDR as the interest rate at which they switch. 
ARA: Risk aversion is measured using a question that asks what payment pattern is preferred. The 
options are: 1 Your monthly income has a 50% chance of increasing by 30%, but also has a 50% 
chance of decreasing by 10% or 2 Your monthly income is guaranteed to increase by 5%. Those 
who choose 1 are asked the question in which the increasing rate is altered from 30% to 20%. 
Those who choose 2 are asked the question in which the increasing rate is altered from 30% to 
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50%. From these answers, we classify all the respondents into four groups, and assuming constant 
relative risk aversion utility function, we calculate relative risk aversion for each group, which is 
named RRA following Barsky et al. [2]. Dividing RRA by their household income, we calculate 
the absolute risk aversion, ARA.  
ALTRUISM: Altruism is measured using the question “Suppose that you found a well-known 
charity that gave financial help to people who typically had about one-fifth of your family income 
per person. Up to how much of your own family income per month would you be willing to give 
the charity if you knew the money would go directly to benefit these people?” We define a dummy 
variable where “No help at all” =1 and 0 otherwise. 
OVERCON: A variable measuring overconfidence of respondents is defined by the responses to 
the statement “I will never be robbed.” OVERCON is defined as 6 when the answers are five 
options on a scale from “1 It is particularly true for you” to “5 It doesn’t hold true for you at all.”15
UNHEALTH: We define a variable UNHEALTH from the response to the statement “I am anxious 
about my health,” which is any of five options on a scale from “1 It is particularly true for you” to 
“5 It doesn’t hold true for you at all.” Larger UNHEALH implies greater anxiety for health.  
 
TESTP and TESTS: TESTP takes on unity if respondents took a periodic blood test in the previous 
12 months and zero otherwise. TESTS takes on unity if respondents took a blood test because of 
suspicion of disease in the last 12 months and zero otherwise.  
EXVACCIN: We define EXVACCIN that takes unity if the answer to the question “Have you ever 
received a flu shot?” is yes and zero otherwise. 
EXFLU: We define EXFLU that takes unity if the answer to the question “Have you been infected 
by the flu during the last two years?” is yes and zero otherwise. 
MALE: A dummy variable with male=1 and female=0. 
AGE: Age of the respondent. 
UNMRRY: A dummy variable with unmarried=1and 0 otherwise. 
NOCHILD: A dummy variable with those who have no children=1 and 0 otherwise. 
SCHOOL: School career, which is defined by “the highest level of education completed” from “1 
Grade school” to “11 Doctorial degree.” 
WAGE: Wage is defined based on the following three questions as 
)7/36(35
62
QQ
Q
×
.  
Q35. About how many hours per week do you work for pay in a typical week?  
Q36. About how many days do you work for pay per year? 
Q62. How much was your annual income earned for 2004?  
                                                   
15 The confidence of “never be robbed” may exist for good reasons for some people. They might be 
too poor to be robbed. Or they might have taken the most foolproof measures for security. Or they live 
in safer places. In order to adjust these elements, we regress OVERCON over financial wealth of 
respondents and variables representing size of city where respondents live and 10 regions of Japan and 
define OVERCON2 as the constant term plus estimated residuals. However, no explanatory variables of 
the regression were significant and the regression as a whole was insignificant by F-test (p-value was 
0.8). Thus, we report only the results with OVERCON.  
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Sixty-nine percent answered “yes” to the question “Are you currently employed?” so that we got 
only 1147 observations for the equation including WAGE. 
HOMEWORK: This is a proxy for time discounting, since those who finish unpleasant tasks 
earlier are considered to be more patient, or more future-oriented. HOMEWORK is defined using 
the answers to the following question: When you were a child, if you were given an assignment in 
school, when did you usually do the assignment? 1 Got it done right away 2 Tended to get it done 
early, before the due date 3 Worked on it daily up until the due date 4 Tended to get it done 
toward the end 5 Got it done at the last minute 
UMBRELLA: This is a proxy for risk aversion and is defined as an answer to the following 
question: When you usually go out, how high does the probability of rain have to be before you 
take an umbrella? (Percentages between 0 and 100). 
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Table 1. Definitions and mean values of variables in the study 
  Range   
Variable  Definition Min Max Mean Std error 
WTVACCIN Willingness to be vaccinated 1 5 2.712  0.029  
PROB Subject assessment of probability of getting flu (%) 0 100 23.868  0.469  
SEVERITY Self-assessment of seriousness of flu 1 6 3.260  0.026  
BOTHER Degree of bothering one’s family and friends if infected 1 4 2.874  0.018  
EFFECT Effectiveness of vaccination 1 5 2.950  0.016  
SIDEEFFE
CT Seriousness of side effects of vaccination 1 7 3.055  0.039  
FEE Fee for inoculation 1 6 4.539  0.021  
INCOME Annual income per family member (ten thousand yen) 8.333  1500 222.807  3.632  
TDR Time discount rate -0.562  26.890  7.904  0.272  
ARA Absolute risk aversion 0.000  0.444  0.036  0.001  
OVERCON Degree of overconfidence 1 5 2.784  0.022  
UNHEALT
H Anxiety regarding health 1 5 3.223  0.025  
ALTRUISM Degree of altruism 0 1 0.551  0.012  
EXVACCIN Experience of flu vaccination 0 1 0.521  0.012  
EXFLU Experience of contracting flu 0 1 0.113  0.008  
TESTP Had a periodic blood test in the last 12 months  0 1 0.652  0.011  
TESTS Had a blood test because of suspected disease in the last 1   0 1 0.096  0.007  
DMAN A dummy variable where male = 1, female = 0  0 1 0.492  0.012  
AGE Age of respondent 22 72 49.215  0.302  
UNMARRY A dummy variable where unmarried = 1, otherwise = 0  0 1 0.128  0.008  
NOCHILD A dummy variable where no children = 1, otherwise = 0 0 1 0.192  0.009  
SCHOOL Level of education where 1 = lowest and 11 = highest  1 11 4.081  0.048  
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Table 2. Results of basic Equation (6) and extended regression Equation (7) for estimating 
vaccination behavior, WTVACCINa 
  Equation (6) 
Equation (7) 
using 
ALTRUISM 
Equation (7) 
using ALTRUISM 
*BOTHER 
Variable   Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
CONSTANT   -0.978 0.000 -2.445 0.000 -2.34 0.000 
PROB   0.008 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.000 
DAMAGE SEVERITY 0.134 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.112 0.000 
  BOTHER 0.236 0.000 0.26 0.000 0.22 0.000 
EFFECT   0.251 0.000 0.228 0.000 0.227 0.001 
COST SIDEEFFECT -0.046 0.004 -0.057 0.001 -0.057 0.204 
 FEE 0.015 0.594 0.038 0.202 0.038 0.045 
  INCOME 0.0004 0.030 0.0004 0.051 0.0004 0.027 
TDR  -0.005 0.019 -0.005 0.029 -0.005 0.038 
ARA  1.1 0.014 1.033 0.038 1.034 0.852 
Behavioral variables OVERCON - - 0.004 0.893 0.005 0.027 
 UNHEALTH - - 0.057 0.026 0.057 0.000 
 ALTRUISM - - 0.217 0.000 - - 
  ALTRUISM* BOTHER - - - - 0.076 0.000 
 EXVACCIN - - 0.877 0.000 0.878 0.156 
 EXFLU - - 0.116 0.164 0.118 0.108 
 TESTP - - 0.099 0.111 0.1 0.250 
 TESTS - - 0.116 0.248 0.115 0.004 
 MALE - - -0.153 0.004 -0.154 0.000 
 AGE - - 0.018 0.000 0.018 0.082 
 UNMARRY - - 0.217 0.085 0.219 0.006 
 NOCHILD - - -0.292 0.006 -0.293 0.384 
 SCHOOL - - -0.012 0.374 -0.012 0.000 
Boundary values μ3 1.069 0.000 1.174 0.000 1.174 0.000 
 μ4 1.747 0.000 1.964 0.000 1.964 0.000 
  μ5  2.347 0.000 2.686 0.000 2.688 0.000 
Pseudo R2  0.111  0.291  0.292  
Number of observations 1849   1752   1752   
 
aThe first column contains the variables that determine WTVACCIN. When the variable in the first 
column consists of multiple variables, those are shown in the second column. The estimation 
method is ordered probit. 
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Table 3. Examination of time discounting and risk aversiona 
  
Equation (6) using 
HOMEWORK and 
UMBRELLA 
Equation (5) 
using 
 
ARA*SEVERITY 
and 
ARA*SIDEEFFF
ECT 
 Equation (5) 
using 
ARA*EFFECT* 
SEVERITY 
Variable   Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
CONSTANT   -0.863 0.000 -0.912 0.000 -0.834 0.000 
PROB   0.007 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.000 
DAMAGE SEVERITY 0.13 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.11 0.000 
  BOTHER 0.229 0.000 0.235 0.000 0.234 0.000 
EFFECT   0.254 0.000 0.249 0.000 0.222 0.000 
COST SIDEEFFECT -0.0002 0.993 0.015 0.588 0.016 0.570 
 FEE 0.0002 0.249 0.0003 0.058 0.0003 0.059 
  INCOME -0.045 0.003 -0.025 0.191 -0.029 0.107 
Time discount TDR - - -0.005 0.016 -0.005 0.016 
  HOMEWORK -0.035 0.045 - - - - 
Risk aversion ARA - - - - - - 
 UMBRELLA 0.004 0.001 - - - - 
 ARA*SEVERITY - - 0.77 0.003 - - 
 ARA*EFFECT*SEVERITY - - - - 0.219 0.003 
 ARA*SIDEEFFFECT - - -0.605 0.028 -0.46 0.050 
Boundary value μ3 1.069 0.000 1.07 0.000 1.07 0.000 
 μ4 1.748 0.000 1.748 0.000 1.748 0.000 
  μ5  2.33 0.000 2.349 0.000 2.349 0.000 
Pseudo R2  0.109 - 0.113 - 0.113 - 
Number of observations 2173 -  1849 -  1849 -  
 
aThe first column indicates the variables that determine WTVACCIN. When the variable in the first 
column consists of multiple variables, those are shown in the second column. The estimation 
method is ordered probit.  
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Table 4. Results of extended regression Equation (7) for estimating vaccination behavior, WTVACCIN 
using fitted values from auxiliary Equation (8) 
 FITTED_PROB FITTED_SEVERITY FITTED_BOTHER 
Parameter Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Constant -2.792  0.000 -2.786  0.001 -0.682  0.800 
FITTED_PROB 0.016  0.007 . . . . 
PROB . . 0.009  0.000 0.009  0.000 
FITTED_SEVERITY . . 0.145  0.000 . . 
SEVERITY 0.115  0.000 . . 0.151  0.000 
FITTED_BOTHER . . . . -0.331  0.671 
BOTHER 0.269  0.000 0.294  0.592 . . 
EFFECT 0.216  0.000 0.236  0.000 0.238  0.000 
SIDEEFFECT -0.049  0.003 -0.039  0.000 -0.048  0.004 
FEE 0.048  0.110 0.049  0.015 0.057  0.058 
INCOME 0.0004  0.032 0.0004  0.101 0.0002  0.479 
TDR -0.005  0.040 -0.005  0.064 -0.005  0.025 
ARA 0.947  0.058 1.041  0.033 0.795  0.158 
UNHEALTH 0.043  0.113 0.049  0.037 0.086  0.107 
ALTRUISM 0.213  0.000 0.212  0.212 0.218  0.000 
EXVACCIN 0.863  0.000 0.865  0.000 0.886  0.000 
TESTP 0.094  0.130 0.100  0.000 0.110  0.083 
TESTS 0.110  0.269 0.113  0.136 0.230  0.197 
MALE -0.128  0.018 -0.134  0.277 -0.208  0.056 
AGE 0.020  0.000 0.018  0.068 0.010  0.306 
UNMARRY 0.263  0.044 0.231  0.000 0.083  0.716 
NOCHILD -0.286  0.007 -0.290  0.070 -0.396  0.023 
SCHOOL -0.012  0.395 -0.012  0.017 -0.010  0.494 
μ3 1.157  0.000 1.165  0.454 1.159  0.000 
μ4 1.935  0.000 1.950  0.000 1.937  0.000 
μ5  2.652  0.000 2.669  0.000 2.642  0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.274  - 0.282  0.000 0.268  - 
Number of observations 1752 - 1752 - 1752 - 
 
